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Executive Summary 
he additional funding for mitigation and adaptation will most likely come from private 
investments on the condition that domestic policies and policies succeed in shifting 
investment flows. A robust global carbon price signal is a necessary condition but not 
sufficient, however. Sufficient conditions include efficient and liquid global capital markets and 
a progressive reduction in barriers to capital flow. Domestic policies and measures for shifting 
investment patterns require supporting tools for international cooperation. In climate change 
policy, international cooperation provides countries with high abatement costs the option of 
low-abatement costs to reduce emissions abroad. Such options include the use of flexible 
mechanisms, the Green Investment Scheme and the possible use of post-2012 mechanisms 
currently under discussion, including Sectoral No-Lose targets and crediting for avoided 
deforestation. A multilateral fund has been playing a prominent role in catalysing financial 
investments and flows during the Kyoto Protocol commitment period. Several policy options 
for raising additional revenues have been tabled: auctioning in a cap-and-trade scheme, 
proceeds from credit transactions, a levy on aviation, Tobin tax, progressive global tax, debt for 
efficiency and donated special drawing rights. These options, however, are not sufficiently 
reliable for the predictable, stable or timely delivery of revenues expected from developing 
countries, especially those with a low capacity to raise their own revenues for the 
implementation of policies and mitigation or adaptation measures. Hence, grants, loans, and 
other instruments provided by international financial institutions should remain the principal 
source for such countries. Carbon market instruments, which are rapidly emerging and being 
elaborated, will help to scale up the overall investments and flows and benefits of all market 
participants. Caution is required in considering the specific policy context of climate change 
when we consider the possibilities for developing financial facilities and instruments. Some 
policy options are inherently tied to an agreement on commitments in a post-2012 agreement. 
For example pure recycling revenues from auctioning will not be politically acceptable. A 
future finance model is expected to moderate disparity in capacities among the parties, 
including asymmetry in the allocation of financial flows and investments. A pragmatic approach 
would be to let markets work and maintain the dynamics of private investments and public-
private partnerships while correcting distortion to the markets through concerted efforts to 
increase financial transfer to under-financed countries, especially LDCs. The proposals point to 
several key features of a future finance model and trigger a series of questions for further 
discussion. The most interesting questions centre on the link between the base of revenues and 
the polluter pays principle (PPP); whether to earmark; the form and modality of a future fund 
and how to ensure the predictability, stability and timeliness of funding. 
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1. Introduction 
The provision of financial resources is an integral part of the overall UN framework for climate 
change. In the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Article 4.3 
(commitments) makes it clear that developed country Parties pledged to provide financial 
resources to pay for the costs incurred by developing country Parties.
1 Article 11 (financial 
mechanism) sets out the definition, governance or modality arrangements of this pledge.
2 In the 
Kyoto Protocol Article 11.2 reiterates developed countries’ commitments. Developing country 
Parties claim that developed country Parties have not made sufficient resources available, given 
the magnitude of the challenge they are facing, which can be addressed as the challenge of 
‘filling the financial gap’ (see Behrens, 2008a). More controversial would be the lack of 
attention to the principle stated in Article 4.3 of the Convention: 
the implementation of these commitments shall take into account the need for 
adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate 
burden sharing among the developed country Parties (emphasis added by the authors). 
It is not only the quantity but also the quality of financial resources that lead developing country 
Parties to question the progress of commitments made by developed country Parties. 
In the Bali Action Plan, the Parties (COP) to UNFCCC launched a comprehensive new process 
to enable the full, effective and sustainable implementation of the convention through long-term 
cooperative action for now, up to and beyond 2012. In this process the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) has a mandate to set out the steps needed to 
reach the envisaged international agreement at the COP15 in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. 
One of the building blocks for the agreement is enhanced action on the provision of financial 
resources and investment. More than a dozen proposals for a future finance model have been 
                                                      
* Noriko Fujiwara and Anton Georgiev are Research Fellows at CEPS, and Christian Egenhofer is Senior 
Research Fellow at CEPS. 
1 Article 4.3, UNFCCC, states: “the developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in 
Annex II shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by 
developing country Parties in complying with their obligations such as submission of national 
communications,” (Article 12.1). “They shall also provide such financial resources, including for the 
transfer of technology, needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs 
of implementing measures” as required by the general commitments (Article 4.1) and “that are agreed 
between a developing country Party and the international entity or entities referred to in the Financial 
Mechanism” (Article 11). 
2 Article 11, UNFCCC, addresses the definition of a financial mechanism, representation and governance, 
modality and other arrangements, and availability of financial resources related to the implementation of 
the Convention through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels. 2 | FUJIWARA, GEORGIEV & EGENHOFER 
submitted by Parties including representatives of regional groups (e.g. EU, G77 and China, 
AOSIS) for discussion at the UN negotiations in Accra, Ghana in August.  
Given the time constraint, such solutions should become operational and functional within a 
reasonable time-frame, once such an agreement is reached in Copenhagen. This condition leads 
to a pragmatic approach that attempts to introduce both domestic policies and tools for 
international climate cooperation aimed at shifting investment patterns on the one hand, and to 
explore innovative tools for raising additional revenues on the other. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the need to shift investment patterns and 
identifies possible instruments to assist this process. Section 3 deals with potential instruments 
for raising revenues and Sections 4 and 5 examine existing and new funding instruments and 
disbursement, respectively. Section 6 describes recent proposals for a new finance model before 
the concluding Section 7 lists a number of questions for discussion.  
2.  The need to shift investment flows  
Behrens (2008a) indicates in his analysis that the majority of finance will be expected from 
private capital, provided that policies or measures succeed in shifting investment flows. Such 
shifts will occur if carbon is priced domestically and globally. This will be enhanced to the 
extent that global capital markets are efficient and liquid and that barriers to the free flow of 
capital gradually come down. In the absence of a global carbon signal that is sufficiently robust 
and in light of existing barriers to capital flow, it is worth exploring what policies and measures 
could facilitate a shift in investment flows.  
2.1  Policies and measures  
Without a global carbon signal, the shifting of investment patterns onto a lower carbon 
trajectory will largely depend on regional, national or even local policies. A number of Parties 
to the UN Treaty carry out climate change policies. The proposed EU climate and energy 
package is but one example. Diverse measures such as the development of emissions trading 
schemes, support for renewables and emissions regulations, are undertaken to shift investment 
patterns onto a more sustainable path. Probably one of the most effective measures in the short 
term is to withdraw fossil fuel subsidies or subsidies to products and services that harm the 
climate. Another way is to remove barriers to trade or investments (e.g. standards, building 
codes, energy efficiency or zoning codes) in low-carbon products and services. Such measures 
could lead to not only saving specific costs but also to a better overall allocation of resources 
through change in consumer behaviour.  
2.2  Tools to assist the shift of investment patterns 
Governments individually, jointly or multilaterally carry out measures to support such a shift in 
investment patterns. This includes first of all the Kyoto Protocol flexible mechanisms, future 
CDM, Green Investment Schemes (GIS), and possible new ‘post-2012 mechanisms’ such as 
Sectoral No-lose Targets and crediting for avoided deforestation.  
2.2.1  The Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms and the future CDM market 
The CDM has become an important tool for emissions reductions in developing countries. In 
May 2008, there were 3498 CDM projects under validation and registration in the CDM project 
pipeline. In 2007, 551 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent to 7426 million $US were 
managed under the CDM. The current project pipeline has the capacity to reduce 2500 million 
tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent and the CDM may have generated around 1000 millions of 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) by 2012. The average price of a CER was between €10 FINANCING MITIGATION & ADAPTATION | 3 
(upfront payment) and €17 (paid on delivery). Most authors anticipate some form of CDM to 
remain part of a future regime. ECN estimates the annual volume of the CDM under current 
rules to be at 450 million tonnes annually for the 2013-2020 period, around the same level as 
today (Bakker et al., 2007). If eligibility criteria were to be expanded (excluding avoided 
deforestation), this figure could go up to 3.2 billion tonnes of CO2e for the same period (at a 
price of €20/tCO2e). This would amount to approximately €64 billion. If we assume that the 
CDM can leverage investment four times the CERs traded, the overall leveraged investment 
would be around €240 billion.  
Despite this relative success in terms of market indicators, the distribution of CDM projects is 
contested, in particular based on the observation that it is unevenly spread across the globe. 
Three countries (China, India and Brazil) account for two thirds of the projects and as regions, 
Latin America and the Asia and Pacific region host 96% of the projects. Africa was bypassed 
earlier in the CDM investments flows, but has now somewhat risen to hold a market share of 
5% of transacted volumes of Certified Emission Reductions, even though the number of 
projects (74) is still rather low (Biermann et al., 2008). In addition there are long-standing issues 
regarding the efficiency in governance structure centring on the Executive Board. Nevertheless, 
both the distribution of projects and reforms of the Executive Board are considered to be largely 
transitional problems and have been addressed in UN negotiations. 
2.2.2  The Green Investment Scheme 
A number of developed country Parties with expected high abatement costs (e.g. Japan, Spain, 
Austria) not only built up large reserves of CDM or JI credits but also explored the possibilities 
for the purchase of AAUs. Given the controversy of the Kyoto Protocol’s provision on AAU 
trade, Japan, Spain, Ireland, Austria and the Netherlands have expressed their interest in linking 
their purchase of AAUs with real emission reductions via a Green Investment Scheme (GIS) 
(Capoor & Ambrosi, 2008). A green investment scheme (GIS) would in effect make trade of 
AAUs conditional upon real emission reductions. It could be agreed in advance that revenues 
from sales of excess AAUs will be invested into projects that could lead to further emission 
reductions in the host country. In an early stage, expressions of interest in hosting a GIS largely 
came from central or eastern European countries that were projected to have a relatively small 
size of excess AAUs but were considered to have institutional and administrative capacities 
(e.g. Latvia, Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary and Poland). Japan signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Hungary and the Netherlands did so with Romania. Recently Ukraine, a 
country with a larger potential to supply AAUs, has improved its institutional and 
administrative capacities and established procedures for GISs (e.g. Averchenkov, 2008). In 
future small or middle-sized middle-income countries may take up quantitative commitments to 
emissions reductions and be assigned AAUs like Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol. 
They could benefit from setting up a joint multilateral GIS in which excess AAUs will be 
pooled and jointly managed to save administrative costs. Management of a GIS can be also 
integrated with existing regional institutions. Nevertheless, the potential of a GIS to raise 
additional revenues will directly depend on Annex I Parties’ willingness to take on AAUs in the 
post-2012 period, which is highly uncertain. 
2.2.3  Sectoral No-Lose Targets (SNLT) and crediting for avoided deforestation 
As a variation of CDM and part of the post-2012 agreement, Sectoral No-Lose Targets (SNLT) 
are proposed (Ward et al. 2008). The advantage of this proposal is that there is no requirement 
for the measurement of additionality. This is because the quantitative elements of the overall 
post-2012 agreement would set up a direct link between targets of developed countries and 
credits to be generated by SNLTs from developing countries. Nonetheless, SNLT still requires 
an agreement on sectoral baselines as well as measurement and data collection, which would 4 | FUJIWARA, GEORGIEV & EGENHOFER 
limit its application to selected sectors. While the Accra talk did not yield progress in work on 
sectoral approaches, it sent a positive signal to the role of deforestation, which reportedly 
accounts for about 20% of global GHG emissions in the post-2012 agreement. It is possible that 
a new market will be created for credits from avoided deforestation. These proposals are subject 
to the same challenge as the one evolving CDM would face: how to impose stringent 
commitments on developed countries to match an increase in the supply of credits from 
developing countries, and how to remove the deep suspicion among developing countries about 
any notion that would inspire target-setting.  
2.2.4 Multi-lateral  funds 
In addition, developed countries contribute and deliver financial resources to a multilateral fund. 
Under the UNFCCC, Article 4.3, Annex II Parties pledged to provide financial resources to the 
implementation of measures by developing countries through UNFCCC financial mechanisms 
operated by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Furthermore, a number of special funds 
have been established: Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF); Least Developed Countries Fund 
(LDCF); and Adaptation Fund. See also Section 4 on finance instruments.  
Developing country Parties have been particularly concerned with the sources of such finance 
and have worked hard to ensure that funding should be new and additional (e.g. not diverted 
from existing Official Development Assistance, ODA). While ODA in general accounts for less 
than 1% of global investment, the least developed countries (LDCs) in particular rely on soft 
loans from international financial institutions (IFIs) and ODA with a limited share of private 
investments. Multilateral and bilateral funding is a significant source of investment (about 1 to 
7%) in developing countries (UNFCCC).  
The largest potential to increase funding is expected from private investments and public-
private partnerships, especially through the expansion of carbon markets. As many of the 
vehicles used in this area are hybrid, see the discussions under the section on instruments in 
Section 4.  
3.  Where can additional revenues be raised?  
In theory there are two options to deal with financing requirements: to raise additional revenues 
to meet additional expenses, or to control spending within the given budget. In the context of 
climate change policy in general and that of post-2012 negotiations in particular, while the latter 
may contribute to plugging the gap, on its own it is not an option. In the UNFCCC, developed 
country Parties pledged to make resources available for the implementation of measures by 
developing country Parties. The former has neither made sufficient progress in work nor paid 
attention to the need for adequacy or predictability in the flow of funds or the importance of 
appropriate burden sharing. This leaves us only one route: raising additional revenues. 
The goal of raising additional revenues can be achieved through different means. UNFCCC 
(2007) identified three categories of significant changes to be made in the patterns of investment 
and financial flows: shifting investments and financial flows made by private and public 
investors to more sustainable climate-friendly alternatives; scaling up international private and 
public capital dedicated to investments and financial flows in mitigation or adaptation activities 
or technologies, and optimising the allocation of the funds available by spreading the risks 
across private and public investors. Of the three types this paper covers the first two – shifting 
and scaling up.  
Below we address a set of policy options: some are being implemented; others remain 
conceptual. The following options are listed as examples and are by no means exhaustive. A 
table appears in the Appendix. FINANCING MITIGATION & ADAPTATION | 5 
3.1  Revenues from auctioning  
The most obvious source of additional public finance is through auctioning in cap-and-trade 
emissions trading regimes. Expected revenues in the EU from auctioning under the EU ETS 
will amount to around €55 billion annually for the period 2012 to 2080. And even in a scenario 
whereby auctioning will apply only to the power sector, there would still be total revenues 
accruing to member states in the order of €33 billion for the same period. This could even go up 
to a total of €80 billion annually. Similar schemes are developed in other parts of the world, 
including the US.  
The auctioning of international aviation and shipping allowances has been estimated to generate 
revenue of $23.6/tCO2, $22 billion in 2010, $28 billion in 2020 and $35 billion in 2030 
(UNFCCC, 2007). 
As revenue from auctioning in a cap-and-trade scheme depends on the market price and 
willingness of participants to pay, there is a lack of predictability or stability about the exact 
amount of revenues. This feature would make it difficult for LDCs to rely on auctioning-based 
support for budgeting and implementing domestic policies and measures. Hence auctioning 
would be more suitable as a complement to conventional public finance despite its ability to 
raise a higher amount of revenue.  
3.2  Proceeds of credit transactions 
There is already a 2% levy or proceed of the CDM as a revenue source. Even limiting such a 
levy on the CDM only at this stage could deliver significant returns. The size of the revenues 
depends both on the volume and the price of CO2 after 2012. Under current CDM rules, ECN 
(Bakker et al. 2007) estimates a trade of 450 million of CERs (at a price of €20/tCO2e), which 
is translated into a total volume of €9 billion. A 2% share of proceeds would amount to €180 
million. Using far wider eligibility criteria from the same ECN study (Bakker et al. 2007), the 
total supply could go up to 3.2 billion t/CO2e (at a price of €20/tCO2e), which would be 
translated into a total volume of €64 billion. A 2% proceed would amount to around €1.2 billion 
p.a. 
The uneven distribution of CDM projects (2.2.1) and limiting a levy to CDM mean that to their 
frustration only a handful of host countries, mainly the large developing ones with unilateral 
projects, currently contribute to the adaptation fund from which some will be then recycled to 
themselves but others disbursed to developing countries at high risk. One solution would be to 
share the payment between a host country and credit buyers. Another would be to extend such a 
levy to JI or AAU trade involving developed countries and credit buyers, like auctioning the 
volume of and revenue from credit transactions may vary year by year. Unlike cap-and-trade, 
CDM and JI themselves are likely to give less margin for upfront payment (c.f. loans such as 
CCFF and CCTAF for developers in Section 4.1). These features would also make a levy on 
credit transaction as a complement to public finance.  
3.3  Levy on aviation 
There has been a proposal for a levy on international aviation. The rationale for such a levy is 
that the sector by definition is international and will therefore need international policy 
coordination. According to the UNFCCC, International Air Travel Levy could generate $13 
billion annually, if set at $6.5 per passenger per flight (Müller & Hepburn, 2006, cited in 
UNFCCC, 2007). Revenues from auctioning have been covered in the section on auctioning, 
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3.4 New  concepts 
a) Tobin tax 
In the context of the Tobin tax discussion, using the proceeds for climate change has been 
suggested. It taxes all cross-border trade of currencies, intended to penalise short-term 
speculation in currencies and therefore to address currency volatility. Originally, the proposed 
tax rate was set at 1%, subsequently to be lowered to between 0.1%, 0.25% or even below (e.g. 
Reisen, 2002; Hanke et al., 2007). The possible annual revenue from the Tobin tax has been 
estimated at 2003 $30-35 billion if set at 0.02% and at 2003 $15-20 billion while, if set at 
0.01%, assuming that the tax should be kept low for political and technical reasons (Nissanke, 
2003, cited in UNFCCC, 2007).  
The likelihood for such a tax is uncertain and the current financial crisis will not make it a 
priority. It should also be expected that revenues would be rather used for addressing the 
consequences of the financial crisis rather than climate change.  
b) Progressive global tax 
Another example is a proposal for progressive global tax (Baer et al., 2007). Introduction of 
carbon taxes or cap-and-trade will need to be combined with compensating policies due to 
concerns with higher energy prices and the subsequent impacts on economy (e.g. inflation, 
balance of payments, fiscal deficit, growth) (Banuri, 2008). Revenues from taxes can be used to 
soften such impacts. 
c) Debt for efficiency  
Another experimental approach is the concept of ‘debt-for-efficiency’ swaps, which was 
inspired originally by ‘debt-for-equity’ swaps and, in environmental policy, preceded by ‘debt-
for-nature’ swaps in the 1990s. The concept of ‘debt-for-nature’ swaps was to link reduction in 
country-debt with outcomes of nature conservation projects orchestrated by host country 
governments, IFIs, and environmental NGOs in an early form of public-private partnerships. 
Similarly ‘debt-for-efficiency’ is designed as a scheme in which creditors negotiate an 
agreement that cancels a portion of the non-performing foreign debt outstanding in exchange for 
a commitment by the debtor government to invest the cancelled amount in clean energy projects 
domestically (UNFCCC 2007).  
d) Donated special drawing rights 
A final innovative option for raising additional revenues refers to a fund to invest foreign 
exchange reserves to donated special drawing rights for climate change activities. 
4.  What different funding instruments can deliver 
This section addresses the generic (or notional) types of instruments that are utilised to fund 
climate change activities. We have identified three notional types of instruments; i) ODA-type 
of instrument (i.e. grant and soft loans), ii) other instruments and iii) carbon market instruments. 
After describing the different instruments, we explain how they work and to which areas they 
are usually applied, before giving a very rough estimate of the cumulative size of existing 
mechanisms (funds, facilities etc.) that employ each type of instrument. Please note that in 
reality, finance facilities often use a mix of instruments (we refer to these as hybrids). 
4.1 Grants  and  loans 
Grants represent transfers that can either be made in cash, goods or services (OECD, DAC’s 
Glossary). They do not require repayment by the beneficiary. In the area of climate change, this FINANCING MITIGATION & ADAPTATION | 7 
is one of the principal tools used in multilateral or bilateral public sector assistance. The 
contributions, stemming from donor countries’ budgets, are disbursed to beneficiaries by 
mechanisms, such as the GEF, through grants of various sizes. Projects, and increasingly 
programmes in developing countries aimed at mitigation and adaptation to climate change, 
benefit from such grants. The typical activities covered include renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, sustainable transport, low-GHG energy technologies, enabling activities and 
adaptation,
3 usually combined with other sustainable development and environmental benefits. 
Land use and forest management practices are also increasingly being addressed, especially by 
recently created mechanisms (e.g. the GEF Tropical Forest Account TFA). 
Apart from the multilateral funds under the financial mechanism of the convention (GEF Trust 
Fund, Adaptation Fund, SCCF and LDCF), grants are also typically employed by other 
multilateral and bilateral mechanisms, such as the European Commission’s Global Climate 
Change Alliance (GCCA) (Behrens, 2008b). In rare cases the Multilateral Development Banks 
(MDBs) also use grants, mostly for technical assistance or project preparation, as in the World 
Bank’s implementing and co-financing operations related to GEF, but especially in the recently 
announced Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), i.e. the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the 
Strategic Climate Fund (SCF), and in the non-market elements of the Carbon Partnership 
Facility (CPF) and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). 
Lending is another traditional instrument for financing, usually in the form of concessional 
(soft) loans. These long-term loans usually employ interest rates below market level and/or 
grace periods (interval to first repayment of capital). Concessionality terms may be determined 
in additional ways by each multilateral or regional development bank (IMF 2003). The activities 
covered by such loans, as well as their sources in terms of donor contributions, are usually the 
same as for the grants above. MDBs and other Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs), such 
as the European Investment Bank (EIB), also employ long-term loans based on favourable but 
maket interest and terms, the funding for which is obtained by borrowing through low risk 
bonds on financial markets (World Bank, 2003).  
Loans are predominantly used by MDBs, e.g. under the World Bank’s principal IBRD/IDA 
lending instrument (including for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects and the 
Clean Energy and Development Investment Framework) (World Bank).
4 The EIB utilises the 
Climate Change Financing Facility (CCFF) and the Climate Change Technical Assistance 
Facility (CCTAF) for upfront lending to developers of Kyoto-based projects. Concessional 
loans have been to a lesser extent employed by the multilateral and bilateral mechanisms above, 
as well as by some of the new ones, e.g. GEF-IFC Earth Fund and the World Bank’s CIFs. 
Due to the fact that grants and (concessional) loans are the primary instruments of international 
multilateral and bilateral donor funding, they are often referred to as ODA-type (Official 
Development Assistance) (Müller, 2008; Porter et al., 2008). For this reason they could be 
grouped together and distinguished from the other/new instruments that are being increasingly 
incorporated in new mechanism designs.  
4.2  Other and new instruments  
Some of the new grant/loan mechanisms include contributions from private entities, essentially 
creating public-private partnerships, such as the World Bank CIFs or the GEF-IFC Earth Fund, 
and to a lesser or significant extent employ additional instruments. Thus, these new instruments 
                                                      
3 More specifically these are the GEF activities. 
4   World Bank, “Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency”, Energy Topics, World Bank website 
(http://go.worldbank.org/6XC42PKNI0, retrieved on 22/09/2008). 8 | FUJIWARA, GEORGIEV & EGENHOFER 
happen to act as a bridge to attracting private sector involvement in climate financing and are 
utilised by some carbon funds as well. Here is a list of the instruments with some of the 
mechanisms to utilise them. 
-  Guarantees and other risk mitigation instruments. Credit guarantees, for example, such as 
the GEF Partial credit guarantees, are a common credit practice involving the guarantor 
reimbursing the lender if the borrower fails to repay a loan (Olivier, 2003; IMF, 2003). In 
the World Bank Group, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provides 
guarantees against non-commercial risks, while the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC)
5 also offers a Carbon Delivery Guarantee for credits from carbon market projects 
(World Bank;
6 IFC, 2008).  
-  Investment in terms of private loans and equity participation is utilised especially by the 
IFC, particularly in clean energy (IFC, 2008). 
o  Risk capital or venture capital for start-up enterprises is the type of investment to be 
provided and leveraged (through sub-funds) by the Global Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF) proposed by the European Commission. 
-  Inducement prizes are usually awarded for technological innovations with specific goals 
defined by the awarding body (Committee on the Design of an NSF Innovation Prize, 
2008). The GEF-IFC Earth Fund is to utilise these (Porter et al., 2008). 
-  Technical assistance is not a financial transfer itself but is usually tied to one, e.g. under 
the GEEREF. The EIB provides expertise to help carry out and thus ensure the success of 
the projects to which the CCTAF lends (EIB, 2007). The IFC provides technical assistance 
in the climate financing field to financial intermediaries in developing countries, together 
with investments (IFC, 2008). 
4.3  Hybrid mechanisms  
The World Bank’s recent initiatives combine a donor-type grant/loan element with a carbon 
fund and several other instruments within the same mechanism without clearly distinguishing 
the amounts for each instrument (CIFs, CPF, FCPF). The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) 
have a targeted capitalisation of $5 billion, which is translated into around $1 billion p.a. for 
their initial operational period (World Bank, 2008c). The Carbon Partnership Facility ($5 
billion), which targets post-Kyoto project credits, includes a Carbon Asset Development Fund 
(CADF) to prepare emission reduction programmes through long-term investments, but the 
amount to be used there is unknown and therefore not mentioned here but referred to below 
(World Bank Carbon Finance Unit (b)).  
4.4  Carbon Market Instruments 
The project credits from Kyoto flexible mechanisms (CDM and JI) bought on the international 
carbon market represent emission reductions (CERs and ERUs)
7 financed by the transaction and 
thus constitute a funding instrument themselves. There are also voluntary emission reduction 
credit types (as opposed to compliance), such as verified emission reductions (VERs), which 
constitute the voluntary carbon market. Each purchase generates additional private investment 
in assets, e.g. a renewable power-generating installation. Additional derivatives and other 
                                                      
5 The private sector arm of the World Bank Group. 
6 World Bank, “Portfolio”, Energy Topic, World Bank website (http://go.worldbank.org/MOBX6YEMS0 
 retrieved on 22/09/2008). 
7 Certified Emission Reduction under CDM, Emission Reduction Units under JI. FINANCING MITIGATION & ADAPTATION | 9 
instruments for hedging risk have been developed, including guaranteed CER (gCER) and 
other guarantees, thus forming the secondary CDM market transactions. 
Carbon procurement vehicles (carbon investment funds) pool private and public capital with the 
goal of securing emission reduction credits to the contributors. There are three types of such 
vehicles: carbon funds, project facilities and government procurement programmes.
8 Although 
countries and other entities may purchase project credits directly, the share of the procurement 
vehicles is significant and growing, estimated at 24% of all CERs and 31% of all ERUs 
(Cochran & Leguet, 2007). The most well-known form of carbon procurement vehicles are the 
carbon funds operated by the World Bank, 11 funds so far (incl. FCPF) with a total 
capitalisation of around $2 billion (Carr & Rosembuj, 2007). However, the envisaged €5 billion 
of the new Carbon Partnership Facility (CPF) may represent a significant scaling-up in the 
future as it includes a carbon fund (World Bank Carbon Finance Unit (b)). 
5. Disbursement 
There are different types of disbursement. Some levies are designated for specific use while 
others are not so restricted. There are one-off transactions like the government purchase of 
AAUs through GIS and tender for CDM or JI credits. There are multilateral funds such as the 
World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund, which was set up by public and private investors in credit-
generating projects. Modes of disbursement could be project-by-project funding, programmatic 
approaches or core/general budget support (Velaso, 2008). Disbursement considerations include 
a choice over support for the mainstreaming of adaptation that requires co-financing or support 
for ‘stand-alone adaptation’, which requires no co-financing. Access considerations include a 
choice over direct access to funding by countries or indirect access through international 
entities, and granting priority access according to vulnerability (Sareen, 2008). 
It is also possible to set up regional or national cap-and-trade schemes and to introduce ‘revenue 
recycling’ as part of the scheme in which revenues raised from auctioning will be reinvested 
into the targeted sectors. This could take different forms: for example, most of the resources are 
collected, pooled, and used up each year; or most of the resources are accumulated in a fund 
from which a share of the proceeds will be reinvested. For political and administrative reasons 
pure revenue recycling – a scheme that collects revenues from and pays them into exactly the 
same sector or country – is unlikely to be supported at the international level, especially in the 
context of UNFCCC. The basic assumption of the UN framework is a disparity between the 
capacities of Parties to cope with climate challenge and an asymmetry in the allocation of 
financial flows and investments among them. A future finance model is expected to moderate 
such a disparity or asymmetry and make financial flows more equitable and evenly distributed. 
The concentration of CDM projects in selected host countries up to and during the first 
commitment period (2008-12) led Parties in Nairobi in 2006 to launch an initiative for 
promoting such projects in Africa. The equitable and even distribution of resources is 
essentially an aspirational goal that would create constant tension and a preference for private 
investors for profitability, cost-effectiveness, and efficiency in resource allocation. The 
                                                      
8 A carbon fund is an investment vehicle specialising in the financing of emission reduction projects 
through upfront payments, equity investment or forward purchase contracts (e.g. the European Carbon 
Fund launched by the Caisse des Dépôts and Fortis Bank). A project facility is specialised in development 
and active management of emission reduction projects (e.g. Japan Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund). 
While these two are open to private investments, government procurement programmes are not open and 
designed to help Annex B Parties meet the Kyoto Protocol targets. Government procurement programmes 
can take the form of carbon funds, project facilities, tender and purchasing programmes (e.g. ERUPT 
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UNFCCC framework attempts to accommodate these two contrasting forces by establishing 
financial mechanisms as a vehicle for developed countries to assist developing countries on the 
one hand, and flexible mechanisms (CDM, JI, AAU trading) on the other as a tool for 
developed countries to meet their commitments in a cost-effective way. As private sector 
investments are estimated to account for 86% of future investment and financial flows 
(UNFCCC, fact sheet), private investments together with public-private partnerships will 
probably play an even more prominent role in leveraging domestic and international capitals. 
One pragmatic scenario is to let markets work and maintain the dynamics of private investments 
and public-private partnerships while correcting distortion to the markets through concerted 
efforts to increase financial transfer to underfinanced countries, especially LDCs. 
6.  Recent proposals for a future finance model 
What emerges from the set of proposals points to several key features of a future finance model. 
Developing countries maintain the conventional view that only developed countries should pay 
into a new financial mechanism based on the polluter pays principle, which would constrain the 
use of private investments beyond compliance flows or markets. In contrast the Swiss proposal 
focuses on the net flow of payment into and disbursement from such a body, which allows a 
degree of flexibility. Developing countries also reiterate that the core of new funding should be 
new and additional (Article 4.3, UNFCCC), complementary to existing funding (e.g. voluntary 
contributions, ODA), and based on grant-oriented public finance while developed countries 
favour public-private partnerships or private investments to leverage domestic or international 
capital. Developed countries tend to highlight the scale or magnitude of the financial gap and 
turn to the private sector for raising additional revenues. Developing countries’ preference for 
public finance may be linked to their attention to predictability, stability and timeliness of 
funding, even though they expect even more to see a drastic increase in the overall level of new 
funding. Developing countries prefer to place any funds under the authority of UNFCCC, 
whereas developed countries prefer to leave their management to the World Bank. The 
following list is neither exhaustive nor comprehensive but serves as an illustration.  
•  The G77-and-China group reiterates that the funding will be new and additional, which is 
over and above ODA (the Philippines, on behalf of the G-77 and China). The level of the 
new funding can range from 0.5% to 1% of GNP of Annex I Parties. The group emphasises 
the importance of the predictability, stability and timeliness of funding. The major source 
of funds should thus be public finance and essentially grant-based, particularly for 
adaptation. The financial mechanism should be operated under the authority of the COP. 
China suggests the establishment of specialised funds for specific demands such as 
adaptation, mitigation and technology acquisition. The financial mechanism should 
facilitate linkages between various funding sources and separate funds. 
•  The AOSIS group equally stresses the availability of new, additional, adequate and 
predictable resources in a timely manner for the implementation of adaptation planning, 
projects and activities (Barbados, on behalf of the AOSIS). A Convention Adaptation Fund 
can be linked to GHG emissions based on the polluter pays principle with criteria for 
contributions and the prioritisation of resources. A share of the proceeds from auctioning 
AAUs, as Norway suggests, can be used for this fund. 
•  India, a member of the G77, places equal importance on the above-mentioned principles 
and calls especially for annual contributions equal to 0.5% of developed country Parties’ 
total GDP in order to ‘meet the agreed full incremental costs’ (Article 4.3, UNFCCC). In 
addition levies on international travel or use of marine haulage and voluntary grant 
funding could be also counted in funding sources. The financial architecture should be FINANCING MITIGATION & ADAPTATION | 11 
organised into functional windows (i.e. specific funds) for specific demands such as 
available technologies, emerging technologies, and technology research. Such funds should 
be placed under a common architecture of governance, funding and investment policies and 
should be operated under the authority of the COP.  
•  Concerning financing adaptation, Switzerland proposes the introduction of a uniform 
global levy of $2 per tCO2 on all fossil fuel emissions, leading to 0.5 US cents per litre of 
liquid fuel (i.e. upstream collection). According to the polluter pays principle all Parties 
assume their fair share of responsibility for addressing climate change in accordance with 
their share of responsibility for the problem. All parties will have to pay, but there are some 
arrangements for developing country Parties. First, for softening the impacts (cf. Banuri, 
2008), free allowance (i.e. tax exemption) of 1.5 tCO2-eq per capita will be granted. Second, 
each Party will pay into both a multilateral adaptation fund and national funds at its own 
ratio. Third, each Party will pay into the multilateral fund and receive funding from the 
body to spend for implementation of measures, mainly adaptation. Net receipts vary across 
Parties. It is estimated that the total revenues for funding the multilateral fund will amount 
to $18.4 billion. The share of industrialised countries’ contribution would be 76%.  
•  Norway proposes auctioning a share of AAUs of all Parties. A small share of allowances 
could be auctioned directly or through a tax on the issuance of allowances. It is estimated 
that a 2% auctioning of the allowance, equivalent to the CDM levy, would generate an 
annual income of between $15 and 25 billion. The amount of allowances to be auctioned 
could be predetermined by a number of allowances, by a fixed percentage of the total 
amount or a predetermined revenue requirement. It is also possible to set up a process for 
deciding the exact amount of allowances at a later stage.  
•  Lastly, Mexico’s approach is to introduce a multilateral agreement on the establishment of a 
world fund. Contributions from each Party will be determined using three simple indicators 
(GHG emissions, population, and GDP) and based on criteria such as the polluter pays 
principle, equity, efficiency, and payment capacity. It is expected that the fund should 
mobilise no less than $10 billion per year. Mexico refers to several mechanisms for 
mobilisation such as auctioning permits in domestic cap-and-trade schemes in some 
developed countries and air travel tax with less reliance on public finance. A part of the 
total contributions could be set aside for LDCs, which might be exempted from making a 
contribution to the fund. The fund will be operated under the COP.  
7.  Questions for further discussion 
1.  Should the revenue base be related to GHG emissions to reflect the polluter pays principle? 
Is there any trade-off between the application of the PPP (i.e. environmental effectiveness) 
and tapping market potential to raise additional revenues (i.e. ability to pay)? 
2.  Which are the most promising revenue sources?  
3.  Is earmarking of auctioning revenues an option? What are the modalities for the 
determination of allowances to be auctioned? 
4.  Which policy options can be developed on their own (e.g. GIS, domestic auctioning) and 
which require an agreement on commitments in the post 2012 agreement (e.g. SNLT)? 
5.  Integration or coordination with existing or proposed funds? 
6.  How to ensure predictability, stability and timeliness of funding 
7.  Should we address governance? 12 | FUJIWARA, GEORGIEV & EGENHOFER 
Note that this paper has not addressed governance issues in great depth but aims to raise a 
number of questions for debate. The UNFCCC states that i) a financial mechanism shall 
function under the guidance of and be accountable to the COP (Article 11.1); ii) the COP shall 
decide on the policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria (Article 11.1); and iii) the 
financial mechanism shall have ‘an equitable and balanced representation of all Parties within a 
transparent system of governance’ (Article 11.2). Key questions include who has authority (e.g. 
the COP under the UNFCCC, the World Bank or other IFIs, or for example under a foundation 
such as the Global Fund to fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria), who should be represented on 
the board, if any (e.g. investors, donors) and who should provide guidance for investments. For 
example, selection criteria for GIS finance have been developed on bottom-up by individual 
host countries in cooperation with the World Bank, which may converge at a later stage. Further 
questions address how such responsibility is to be shared and who is primarily accountable to 
investors or donors. Institutional frameworks or designs also include a choice over multiple 
funds for different purposes or one funding mechanism with different windows.  
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Appendix: Estimates of selected revenue options for 
addressing climate change 
(Note: this table is expected to be further developed and refined with new data). 
Option   Revenue   Notes  
2% CDM levy 2008 – 2012 (Adaptation 
Fund)  USD 80 – 300 million 
From UNFCCC (2007) 
USD 100 – 500 million  Low demand in 2030   2% CDM levy post 2012 (From UNFCCC 
2007)  USD 1 – 5 billion  High demand in 2030  
EUR1.28 billion  Annual in 2020 at 20 €/tCO2-eq   2% CDM levy post 2012 (estimates based 
on Bakker et al. 2007)  EUR 8 billion  Annual in 2020 at 100 €/tCO2-eq 
USD 10 to USD 50 million   Annual average for 2008 to 2012   Application of a levy similar to the 2 per  
cent share of proceeds from the CDM to 
international transfers of ERUs, AAUs and 
RMUs  
Depends on size of carbon 
markets post-2012  
Any estimate for post 2012 requires assumptions 
about future commitments  
International air travel levy   USD 10 to USD 15 billion   Based on charge of USD 6.50 per passenger per 
flight  
USD 22 billion   Annual in 2010 
USD 28 billion  Annual in 2020 
Auction of allowances for international  
aviation and marine emissions (at 
$23.6/tCO2)  USD 35 billion  Annual in 2030 
USD 15 to USD 20 billion   A tax of 0.01 per cent on wholesale currency 
transactions to raise revenue for Convention 
purposes  
Tobin tax  
USD 30 to USD 35 billion  A tax of 0.02 per cent on wholesale currency 
transactions to raise revenue for Convention 
purposes 
 
Sources: UNFCCC (2007); Bakker et al. (2007) and own calculations. 
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